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This paper compares different licensing contracts defined by the type of payment (fees or royalties) and 
contract duration (short- or long-term) in a setting in which an outside patent holder that owns a patented 
innovation lasting for two periods licenses it to downstream Cournot firms; further, there is asymmetric 
information about firms' costs emerged from the use of innovation, but they are signaled through the output 
produced in period 1. In this context, if we concentrate on fee contracts, the patent holder prefers short-term 
(revealing) contracts rather than long-term contracts. From a social perspective, however, short-term fee 
contracts  only dominate  long-term contracts  under certain conditions. Further, when  comparing  fee 
contracts,  royalty  contracts  and  contracts formed by royalties in period 1 and fees in period 2, the 
dominance (to the patent holder) of short-term fee contracts survives. Moreover, (short- or long-term) fee 
contracts are socially  superior to  any other form of licensing  arrangement  since they  imply  a  lower 
distortion in the users' behavior. Thus the dominance of fees that emerges under perfect and complete 
information is robust to the presence of asymmetric information and signaling. 
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Literature on licensing shows that, in a context of perfect and complete information with Cournot 
competition, a non-producing patent holder prefers fee rather than royalty contracts to license an 
innovation
1 (Kamien and Tauman 1986, Katz and Shapiro 1986, Kamien et al. 1992). However, 
asymmetric information problems, where someone owns more information than another (the 
patent holder since it has made the discovery, or the licensee because it has more information 
about the technical production environment),
2
To  analyze  how  the  combination of an outside  patent holder, asymmetric information  and 
signaling  may affect  the  optimal  form  of payments and  duration of licensing contracts, we 
consider a two-period signaling model in which there is an outside patent holder that owns a 
patented innovation  lasting for two production periods. Since the patent holder is unable to 
exploit the innovation, so it should be licensed to several downstream firms, which compete à la 
Cournot in the product market; the production cost of each licensee is unknown to everyone until 
after contracting, at which point each particular user gets private information about its own cost, 
whereas the other players –the competitors and the patent holder– only have a prior assessment of 
such cost (it may adopt a low or a high value with a certain probability); these players can infer, 
however, the true cost after observing the licensee's output of the first period (in the separating 
equilibrium of the signaling game induced by successive short-term contracts), or remain ignorant 
about it (in a long-term contract). In the first case, information is complete in period 2; in the 
second, it remains incomplete.  
 are common in technology transfer. Our interest is 
to investigate whether the dominance of fee payments in licensing arrangements is robust or not 
to the presence of asymmetric information and signaling as a way to solve the asymmetric 
information problem.  
                                                           
1 Contrariwise, a producing patent holder that transfers its innovation to some or all of its competitors prefers royalty 
contracts. 
2 Also, potential licensees may face market uncertainty that affects only some firms, the control of the production level 































In this setting, we examine the outcome of different licensing schemes that may differ in the type 
of payments (fixed fees, royalties, or royalties in period 1 and fees in period 2) and in the duration 
of contracts (short-term contracts renewed periodically versus long-term contracts for the entire 
lifetime of innovation).  The presence of asymmetric information may induce opportunistic 
behavior, since the possibility of the contracts' period-by-period design allows each licensee to 
use signaling strategies to influence other players' beliefs concerning its private information. 
Thus, both scheduled payments and contract duration are likely designed to mitigate these 
problems of opportunism.  
The paper explores three issues. First, does the dominance of fees over royalties that exists in a 
perfect and complete information context survive under asymmetric information and signaling? 
Second, does the  patent holder find it more profitable to offer short-  or  long-term  licensing 
contracts? Third, in evaluating the social performance of the optimal contracting to the patent 
holder, to what extent are private and social interests aligned or in conflict?  
Findings show that if we concentrate on fee contracts, the patent holder always prefers to offer 
short-term (revealing) contracts rather than long-term (non-revealing) contracts. With short-term 
contracts there is indeed a separating equilibrium of the signaling game induced by a series of 
short-term contracts and it is always the patent holder's preferred strategy because signaling in 
period 1 increases the  firms' profits in that period. In addition, after period 1, complete 
information is recovered, and the patent holder can reap the maximum profit of each firm by 
charging the low-cost producer a higher fee than the high-cost one. This difference in payment 
can tempt each efficient user to misrepresent itself by under-producing in such a period, but the 
patent holder can profitably remove this temptation by increasing the upfront fee imposed in 
period 1. This makes the period 1's optimal output for any high-cost firm too low for it to be 































Since the patent holder increases the first-period payment of each licensee in order to screen for 
its cost, it is better off in this period than it would be under a long-term contract. Screening for 
costs implies a deviation of firms' production (compared to production levels that would exist in 
the absence of screening), which benefits the patent holder, whereas signaling is harmless for 
producers because their expected profits are always harvested by the patent holder. As a result, 
the patent holder's preferred licensing agreement is unequivocally a sequence of short-term fee 
contracts, because it increases licensing income in both production periods as compared to long-
term fee contracts. 
Short-term fee contracts dominate not only long-term fee contracts, but also royalty contracts, and 
even  those  contracts formed by royalties in (incomplete information) period 1 and  fees in 
(complete information) period 2.  This means that such contracts are the optimal licensing 
arrangement for a non-producing patent holder in a dynamic setting where each licensee acquires 
informational advantage and may behave opportunistically. Hence, the dominance of fees over 
royalties that prevails under perfect and complete information is robust to the presence of 
asymmetric information and signaling, with the particularity that, in this case, the (outside) patent 
holder prefers a sequence of short-term  (revealing)  contracts  rather than a  long-term  (non-
revealing) contract. In other words, interaction of an outside patent holder (that favors the use of 
fees) and the presence of asymmetric information (that indicates the use of royalties) leads fees to 
be better than royalties as licensing scheme when signaling emerges. 
Finally, fee contracts are socially superior to any other form of licensing arrangement, because 
they induce lower distortion on firms’ choice. However, short-term fee contracts lead to greater 
social welfare than long-term fee contracts only when both the a priori probability of a firm being 
an efficient user of the innovation and the bad realization of production cost are sufficiently high. 
Otherwise, long-term fee contracts are more advantageous for society as a whole. Distortion on 































leads to a decrease on total expected output of that period. Thus, consumers become worse off in 
period 1 compared to a scenario of long-term fee contracts. Moreover, this reduction on consumer 
surplus is so large that it outweighs the increase on patent holder's income in period 1 so that total 
welfare in period 1 under short-term fee contracts is lower than under long-term fee contracts. 
Taking into account that the opposite holds in period 2, when the patent holder and consumers are 
better off under short-term than under long-term fee contracts, the result whereby short-term 
(revealing) fee contracts may be socially superior or inferior to long-term (non-revealing) fee 
contracts holds. That is, a conflict between private and social interests may arise since consumers 
are better off, under some circumstances, if the innovation were diffused via long-term contracts.  
Information problems such as incomplete information, when the absence of information affects 
both parts equally, and asymmetric information, when one party is better informed than the other, 
introduce new issues in  licensing analysis  with respect to a context of perfect and complete 
information. Incomplete information adds risk to the licensing relationship and favors royalty 
payments because they allow shared risk of success or failure (in the new production process or 
the commercialization of the new product) between the seller and the buyer.
3
In a two-period signaling model, Antelo (2009) addressed the question of the optimal duration of 
royalty-only contracts under asymmetric information and signaling. The finding is that if both the 
probability of becoming a low-cost licensee and the value adopted by the bad realization of cost 
are sufficiently large, the patent holder imposes a series of short-term royalty contracts rather than 
a long-term royalty contract. Under such circumstances, short-term contracts allow the patent 
holder to recover complete information in period 2 at little or no signaling cost in period 1. 
  Asymmetric 
information, on the other hand, may give rise to adverse selection problems largely examined by 
licensing literature (Gallini and Wright 1990, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 1991, Beggs 
1992). 
                                                           































Hence, cumulative royalty revenues are higher than under long-term contracts, with no signaling 
and the permanence of incomplete information in period 2. However, a long-term contract is 
preferred whenever signaling is very costly, because the extra income by the acquisition of 
complete information exceeds the cost of collecting such information. The current paper extends 
this framework to one in which the patent holder may choose both the duration and payments of 
licensing contracts. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
examines the outcome of long-term and short-term fee contracts. Both types of contracts are 
compared in Section 4. Fee contracts and other licensing arrangements (royalty contracts and 
contracts formed by royalties in period 1 and fees in period 2) are compared in Section 5. Section 
6 analyzes the best licensing policy for the society as a whole. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The model 
Consider an upstream licensor that owns a patented innovation lasting for two periods, t=1,2. The 
patent holder is unable to exploit the innovation, so it should be licensed to downstream users. 
These users produce a homogeneous product for a market whose demand is given by  
t t t Q Q p − =1 ) ( ,                                                                (1) 
in each production period t, where  t Q  represents total output. For simplicity, we assume only two 
licensees, A and B; so, 
B A
t t t q q Q + = . The demand given in (1) remains unchanged across periods. 
The production cost of each licensee  i,  i=A,B,  is a random variable that adopts one of two 
possible values,  } , 0 { ~ c c
i ∈ , with  0 > c . Only firm i knows for sure the realization of its cost 
derived from using the innovation; the rest of the players –firm j, j≠i, and the patent holder– only 
know the distribution of 
i c ~ , given by  µ = = ) 0 ~ ( Prob
i c  and  µ − = = 1 ) ~ ( Prob c c































All players acting in the game are risk neutral and the discount factor between periods is one. The 
patent holder has all the bargaining power. Finally, the following property is assumed. 
Assumption 1. Marginal cost of production c is such that  2 1 0 < < c . 
Given that parameter c measures not only the marginal cost of each licensee derived from a bad 
realization of the innovation but also the cost difference that may exist between (cost 
heterogeneous) licensees, this assumption ensures that any user i of the innovation will produce 
positive output, regardless of the realization of its marginal cost, that of the rival j, and the belief 
of third parties –firm j and the patent holder– about the firm i's realization. 
3. Fee contracts 
3.1 Long-term contracts 
This section examines the equilibrium of the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the 
patent holder simultaneously proposes a licensing contract to firms, whereby each one can use the 
innovation for its entire lifetime in exchange of  an upfront fee. In the second stage,  firms 
simultaneously decide whether to purchase a license. In the third stage, licensees produce with the 
cost structure assumed in the second stage and with incomplete information. Competition 
between users of the innovation in the market product is à la Cournot. 
A long-term licensing contract has an upfront fee paid by each firm for the entire lifetime of the 
patent. This is equivalent to equal payments in each period. Such fee is given by each firm's 
expected profit per period under incomplete information, because incomplete information exists 
(in period 1), when the patent holder designs the licensing contract covering all production 
periods. Thus each firm faces the problem 
i j
H
i i i j
L































where subscripts L  and  H  denote, respectively, low-  and high-cost licensee, and subscript II 
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q q                                                                       (4) 
as the best-reply for each high-cost firm. From (3) and (4), we have 
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= , i=A,B,                                                                 (5) 
and 
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=                                                                            (6) 
as the equilibrium output of the low- and high-cost licensee, respectively, in each production 
period. Description of the equilibrium is completed with the values of Table 1, where superscript 
PH denotes patent holder. 
Table 1. Equilibrium values in each (II) period of the licensing game induced by long-term fee contracts 
) ~ , ~ (
j i c c   II Q   PH
II π  
i
II π  
) 0 , 0 (    3 ] ) 1 ( 2 [ c µ − +     
36
] ) 5 4 ( 8 [ ) 1 (
9




] ) 2 1 ( 4 [ ) 1 ( c c µ µ + − −  
) , 0 ( c   6 ] ) 2 1 ( 4 [ c µ + −  
) 0 , (c   6 ] ) 2 1 ( 4 [ c µ + −  
12
] ) 2 1 ( 4 [ c c µ µ + −
−  
) , ( c c   3 ] ) 1 ( 2 [ c c µ − −  
 
In sum, the (long-term) licensing contract covering the entire expected lifetime of the innovation 
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1
2 II II c c F
PH i µ µ π + − − − = ≡                                        (7) 
to be paid by each firm i in the first production period. The fact that the patent holder cannot 
distinguish a low- from a high-cost licensee either in the first or in the second period means that 
both types of firm pay the same fee for using the innovation; an amount that equals expected 
profit of each firm through the two production periods. The firm i's expected net profit throughout 
the two production periods is then  
] ) 2 1 ( 4 [ ) 1 (
6
1
II , c c
i
L µ µ π + − − =                                                  (8) 
in the case of an efficient licensee, and 
] ) 2 1 ( 4 [
6
1
II , c c
i
H µ µ π + − − =                                                     (9) 
for an inefficient licensee. That is, each low-cost user gets positive net profits,  0 II , >
i
L π , whereas 
each high-cost firm suffers losses,  0 II , <
i
H π . On average, however, each firm i obtains a zero net 
profit,  0 II =
i π , since all gross profit goes to the patent holder.  
3.2 Period-by-period contracts 
In this case, the patent holder offers a contract to each firm for the first production  period. 
Licensees produce in this period under incomplete information, but each firm i's production is 
observed  by competitor j  and the patent holder. In a Bayesian separating equilibrium, the 
observation of this output allows third parties to infer, in period 2, the firm i's true cost. Knowing 
the licensees'  costs, the patent holder offers another fee contract for the second period. If 































Clearly, the first-period contract designed for each firm will be the same for both types of firm 
because of the patent holder's inability to distinguish between them. In the second period, 
however, the patent holder can discriminate, in a Bayesian separating equilibrium, one type from 
another due to the recovery of complete information from the observation of first period output. 
As usual, a Bayesian separating equilibrium is calculated by backwards induction. 
Period 2 
In a separating equilibrium, the period 2 game becomes a complete information game, where 
information about each licensee's value of the innovation is public. The equilibrium values of 
such a game are collected in Table 2, where subscript CI denotes complete information. 
Table 2. Equilibrium values of the (CI) second period of the game induced by short-term fee contracts 
) ~ , ~ (
j i c c  
i qCI  CI Q   PH
CI π  
i
CI π  
) 0 , 0 (   3 1   3 2   9 1   0 
) , 0 ( c   3 ) 1 ( c +   3 ) 2 ( c −   9 ) 1 (
2 c +   0 
) 0 , (c   3 ) 2 1 ( c −   3 ) 2 ( c −   9 ) 2 1 (
2 c −   0 
) , ( c c   3 ) 1 ( c −   3 ) 1 ( 2 c −   9 ) 1 (
2 c −   0 
 
The values of the fourth column of Table 2 define the contracts offered to each firm i in period 2 
according to its cost realization and that of firm j. In turn, the values of the last column show that 




L π π . Thus, comparing 
i
L CI , π  with (8) and 
i








H II , CI , π π > ,  i.e. whereas each efficient 
licensee obtains less profits in a CI game than in an II scenario, the contrary holds for each 
inefficient user of the innovation. 
The following lemma describes the net profits of each licensee in period 2 when it misrepresents 































Lemma 1. Let  ) ~ ; ( 2
j i c y x π  denote the firm i's net profit in period 2 when it has cost x, but it 
revealed cost y in period 1. Then: 
(i)  12 ) 5 4 ( ) 0 ; 0 ( 2 c c c
i − =  π ,  12 ) 4 ( ) ; 0 ( 2 c c c c
i − =  π ,  12 ) 3 4 ( ) 0 ; 0 ( 2 c c c
i − − =  π   and 
12 ) 4 ( ) ; 0 ( 2 c c c c
i + − =  π . 
(ii)  ) ~ ; 0 ( ) ~ ; ( 2 2
j i j i c c c c c  >  π π  and  ) ~ ; 0 ( ) ~ ; 0 0 ( 2 2
j i j i c c c  <  π π . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Each firm i has a horizontal incentive to be understood as a low-cost firm by its rival j, because 
this reduces j's output and profit in period 2 and, consequently, increases i's output and profit in 
that period. At the same time, each firm has a vertical incentive to report to the patent holder that 
it is a high-cost producer in order to pay a lower fee in period 2. What Lemma 1 states is that the 
latter incentive outweighs the former. Overall, then, each firm i has an interest in being perceived 
as a high-cost firm, regardless its true costs. 
Period 1 
In period 1, the patent holder is unable to distinguish between efficient and inefficient firms, so 
each firm i pays the same fee, irrespective of its type. It also produces output level 
is q1  under 
incomplete information; and output that will be observed to other players, from which they infer 
(in the separating equilibrium of the game) the firm i's true cost. The separating equilibrium of 
minimum cost for the entire game induced by a series of short-term fee contracts may be 
described in the following lemma, where superscript s denotes signaling in period 1. 
Lemma 2. In the separating equilibrium of minimum cost of the licensing game induced by 































(i) In period 1, each firm i, i=A,B, produces  18 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 ( 3 1 1 c c q
is
H µ µ + − + − = , if it is a 
high-cost licensee, and  18 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 1 ( 3 1 1 c c q
is
L µ µ + − − + = , if it is a low-cost  licensee.  
(ii)  Posterior beliefs about firm i's type are  1 ) ~ ( 1 1 = =  =
is
H
i i q q c c Prob   and 
0 ) ~ ( 1 1 = =  =
is
L
i i q q c c Prob . 
(iii) In period 2, output levels of each firm i,
i qCI, are as given in Table 1. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 




H q q II , 1 1 < ; 
that is, each inefficient user of the innovation, in order to be distinguished as such in period 2, is 
forced to produce in period 1 less than the profit-maximizing output it would produce as a simple 
monopolist under II with no signaling activity. In other words, signaling is costly in the entire 
(µ,c)-parameters space defined by  1 0 < < µ  and  2 1 0 < < c . The intuition behind this result is 
simple. According to Lemma 1, each low-cost firm has a strong incentive to misrepresent itself as 
being a high-cost producer since this allows it to have a positive net profit:  12 ) 5 4 ( c c − , if the 
rival firm is a low-cost producer, and  12 ) 4 ( c c − , if the rival is a high-cost producer. 
Consequently, high-cost firms need to under-produce in period 1 to avoid the low-cost firms 
mimic their production levels. As a reaction, the low-cost licensees produce in period 1 a higher 




L q q II , 1 1 > . Nevertheless, 
given that under-production of high-cost firms is a first-order deviation, whereas over-production 































total output of period 1 is lower than it would be under II with no signaling (or, alternatively, if 
signaling were costless). In a sense, signaling is anticompetitive.
4
)] ) 5 4 ( 8 ( ) 1 ( 4 [
9
1
2 II LT c c F
i PH µ µ π + − − − = ≡
 
4. The optimal duration of upfront fee contracts 
In this section, the outcome for the patent holder of long-term and short-term fee contracts are 
compared. According to (7), with long-term fee arrangements the patent holder's revenue is 
,                                   (10) 
where subscript LT stands for a long-term contract covering the entire expected lifetime of the 
innovation.  On the other hand, when licensing policy consists of a succession of short-term 
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− ,    (11) 
where subscript ST denotes short-term contracts. Comparison of revenues given in (10) and (11) 
yields the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.  When licensing is made through fees, the patent holder prefers short-term 
(revealing) contracts rather than long-term (non-revealing) contracts.   
 
In such a series of short-term fee contracts, what each firm pays in the first-period is 
                                                           
4 This will reduce the level of expected consumer surplus achieved in period 1 compared to the level that would exist if 
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3
1 c c µ µ
,    (12) 
irrespective of its type, because the patent holder cannot distinguish a low-cost from a high-cost 
type. In the second period, however, each type of firm pays a different fee depending on the cost 
realizations observed by the patent holder. In particular, the second period licensing contract is 
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i                                                         (13) 
The fact that signaling is costly in period 1 leads to an increase on firms' expected profits for that 
period compared to those they would obtain if signaling were costless (or, similarly, if the 
licensing game were induced by long-term fee contracts). This is because the firms that increase 
their production in period 1 are the low-cost firms, whereas those that decrease their production 
are the high-cost firms; a kind of productive deviation that obviously improves profit. Indeed, the 
increase on firm i's expected profits during period 1 due to signaling amounts to 
      
i is i
II , 1 II , 1 1 π π π ∆ − ≡                 
] ) 2 9 2 ( ) 11 ( 2 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) ) 2 ( 3 2 )[( 1 (
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In addition, a series of short-term contracts allows complete information to be restated in period 
2, yielding more profits to firms in that period than those obtained in the II context induced by 
long-term contracts. Such increase on firm i's expected profits in period 2 amounts to 
2




i i i µ µ π π π ∆ − = − ≡ .                                                (15) 
Consideration of (14) and (15) then directly leads to the result of Proposition 1. Likewise, from 
(12), net profits (denoted by superscript N) in period 1 for each low-cost licensee are positive and 
amount to 
] ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 ( 2 ) 4 1 ( 3 24 [ ) 1 (
36
1
II , 1 c c c c
Nis
L µ µ µ µ π + − + − + − − = ,                     (16) 
whereas those of each high-cost licensee,  
] ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 ( 2 ) 4 1 ( 3 24 [
36
1
II , 1 c c c c
Nis
H µ µ µ µ π + − + − + − − = ,                   (17) 
are negative. The following lemma establishes that fees 
is F II , 1  and 
i FCI , defining the short-term 
contract, allow the patent holder to obtain the whole expected profit of licensees. This may be 
stated in the following lemma, where superscript N denotes net profits and superscript s stands for 
signaling. 
Lemma 3. Each firm i gets, on average, zero net profits both in each period of the short-term 
licensing game,  0 II 1, =
Nis π , 0 CI =
Ni π .
5
                                                           
5 The same holds in each period of the long-term fee licensing game, 
 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
0 II =































Payments given in (12) and (13) allow the patent holder to obtain all expected profits of licensees 
in both production periods. Despite the fee payments, signaling in period 1 distorts the licensees' 
behavior in that period, where II exists. This effect –that fee contracts distort firms' behavior– is 
novel with respect to a context of perfect and complete information in which fees do not distort 
licensees' behavior at all.  
Finally, from (12) and (13) the following corollary can be obtained. 
Corollary 1. If parameters µ and c satisfy  
0 ) ) 4 1 )( 4 ( ) 11 ( 4 ( ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) ) 2 ( 3 2 ( 2 > + − + + − + − + + c c c c c µ µ µ µ µ ,  
then fees of successive short-term contracts are time-decreasing, namely 
i is F F CI 2, II , 1 > . Otherwise, 
they are time-increasing, 
i is F F CI 2, II , 1 < . 
 
This result may be illustrated in Figure 1. 

































In words, if one or both licensees are sufficiently efficient as such that  5 1 < c , fees are time-
decreasing, regardless of the degree of uncertainty. This is because in this circumstance, signaling 
in period 1 leads firms to produce an output level very different than the output they would 
produce under II with no signaling (each efficient firm over-produces and each inefficient firm 
under-produces); this leads the licensees to obtain substantial excess profits, which allow the 
patent holder to charge a high fixed payment. In addition, in period 2 market competition is fierce 
whenever c is sufficiently low, reducing the profits obtained by each user of the innovation. 
Consequently, the payment the patent holder can set in period 2 diminishes. Similarly, when c is 
sufficiently high,  7 3 > c , fees are time-increasing, irrespective of the value of µ, the probability 
of a good realization of the innovation. In this case, signaling is slightly costly and firms’ outputs 
are close to their output levels under II without signaling; so profits are low (and close to profits 
under II without signaling) and the payment that the patent holder can charge to each firm 
decreases. Moreover, market competition in period 2 is soft, which allows the patent holder to 
charge high fees  in such a period. Finally, for intermediate values of the efficiency gap, 
7 3 5 1 < < c ,  fees are likely to be time-decreasing (time-increasing) as µ is sufficiently low 
(high). 
5. Fee vs. other licensing contracts 
If the patent holder can simultaneously choose both the duration of licensing contracts and their 
payment form (fee contracts, royalty contracts, or contracts based on royalties in the first period 
and then fees in the second period), the following result emerges. 
Proposition  2.  When the patent holder can choose both the duration  of contracts and their 
payment form, the optimal licensing policy consists of short-term fee contracts. Namely, short-































(i) Long-term fee contracts. 
(ii) Short- and long-term royalty contracts. 
(iii) (Short-term) contracts based on royalties in period 1 and fees in period 2. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
It is a well-known fact that, under perfect and complete information, fee licensing is a better 
mechanism than royalty licensing for a non-producing patent holder (Kamien and Tauman 1986; 
Katz and Shapiro  1986; Kamien et al. 1992). What Proposition 2  shows  is that this finding 
survives in a dynamic context in which the patent holder lacks information about the value of the 
innovation, although it can  infer  such information from observing the licensees' output. The 
shading that asymmetric information and signaling adds to this finding is that fees are charged 
period-by-period rather than in the first period for the expected lifetime of the innovation. Given 
that signaling is costly and leads to an increase in firms’ expected profits, the duration of the 
contract for one period is better than for two periods.  
Part (i) of the proposition refers to the result of Proposition 1. Part (ii) indicates that royalties 
distort the licensees' behavior and reduce the revenue of the patent holder compared to when 
(short-term) fees are used. Finally, Part (iii) indicates that the superiority of short-term fee 
contracts remains even when considering the potential for the patent holder to design mixed 
contracts using royalties in the first period and fees in the second period.
6
In sum, the underlying idea of Proposition 2 is that in the “conflict” between the presence of an 
outside patent holder –that encourages the use of fees to license the innovation– and the presence 
 The explanation is that 
signaling induced in a royalty situation implies a more pronounced distortion of firms' behavior 
of period 1 (even when fees are charged in period 2) than it does when fees are used.  
                                                           
































of asymmetric information –a fact that induces the use of royalty licensing–, the effect of the 
presence of the outside patent holder dominates, when signaling emerges. 
6. Welfare 
In this subsection, the social performance of the fee-licensing policy is examined. To this end, 
expected welfare is defined as the expected consumer surplus plus the licensees' expected (net) 
profits and the patent holder's licensing income, 
PH
i
i CS W π π + + = ∑ = B A, . From (1), consumer 
surplus can be derived as  ] ) 1 ( 1 )[ 2 1 (
2 Q CS − − = , where Q denotes total output. Given that the 
patent holder accrues all the firms' expected gross profits regardless of the informational context 
(see Lemma 3), expected welfare simply reduces to the sum of expected consumer surplus and 
the patent holder's expected income, 
PH CS W π + = .  
When long-term fee contracts are used to license the innovation and incomplete information 
remains throughout the entire expected lifetime of the innovation, expected consumer surplus in 
period t, t=1,2, amounts to 
)] ) 8 ( 8 ( ) 1 ( 16 [
36
1
II , c c CSt µ µ + + − − =                                                 (18) 
and the patentee's expected revenue to 
)] ) 5 4 ( 8 ( ) 1 ( 4 [
18
1
II , c c
PH
t µ µ π + − − − = .                                                (19) 
From (18) and (19), expected social welfare in each period t is then                                       
)] 3 8 ( ) 1 ( 8 [
12
1
II , c c Wt µ µ − − − = .                                                         (20) 
On the other hand, a licensing game induced by successive short-term fee contracts, each one 
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II , 1 c c c c CS
s µ µ µ µ µ + + − + + + − − − =      (21) 
in period 1 and the income 
is PHs F II , 1 II , 1 2 = π   to the patent holder.
7
)] ) 4 1 )( 8 ( ) 14 ( 4 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 ( 4 ( ) 1 ( 24 [
36
1
II , 1 c c c c W
s µ µ µ µ µ µ + + − + + + − + − − =
 Hence, the level of total welfare in 
period 1 is  
.   (22) 
It follows immediately from (12) and (19) that, in period 1, the patent holder is better off with 
signaling (induced by short-term fee contracts) than in the absence of signaling (in a context of 
long-term fee contracts). However, consumers are unequivocally worse off in this period when 
signaling exists as the following lemma states from checking (18) and (21). 
Lemma 4. In period 1, the following holds: 
(i)  II , 1 II , 1 CS CS
s < . 
(ii)  ] ) 1 )( 8 ( ) 2 ( ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 2 )[ 1 (
27
1 2
II , 1 II , 1 1 c c c c CS CS CS
s µ µ µ µ µ + + − + + + − − − = − ≡ ∇ . 
 
That is, if licensing is done through a series of short-term  fee  contracts, expected  consumer 
surplus in period 1 is lower than it would be when long-term contracts are used. The explanation 
of this result is quite simple. Signaling induced by successive short-term fee contracts forces each 
high-cost licensee to under-produce compared to a non-signaling context and, as a reaction, each 
low-cost licensee over-produces. However, the former distortion is of first-order, whereas the 
latter is a second-order effect and thus its magnitude is lower. Thus, on average, licensees reduce 
output level, i.e.  II 1, II , 1 Q Q
s < , which decreases expected consumer surplus in period 1 when 
signaling exists as compared to the expected consumer surplus that would emerge in an 
                                                           































incomplete information (and no signaling) context. This reduction is indeed so large that it 
outweighs the increase on patent holder profits due to signaling, so overall  II , 1 II , 1 W W
s <  in the entire 
(µ,c)-parameter space. Indeed, from (20) and (22), we obtain 
] ) 6 2 ( 8 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 [( ) 1 (
9
1 2
II , 1 II , 1 c c c c W W
s µ µ µ µ µ µ + + + − − + − + − = − ,             (23)                                                           
which is negative. That is, short-term fee contracts imply lower expected welfare in period 1 than 
long-term contracts. In period 2, however, short-term contracts lead to higher welfare than long-
term contracts. Indeed, expected consumer surplus in period 2 derived from short-term licensing 
contracts amounts to 
)] ) 2 ( 2 ( ) 1 ( 4 [
9
1
CI c c CS µ µ − + − − =                                       (24) 
and the patent holder’s revenue to 




PH µ µ π + − − − =                                      (25) 
whereby expected welfare in such period is 
)] 3 2 ( ) 1 ( 2 [
3
1
CI c c W µ µ − − − =                                               (26) 
and both consumers and the patent holder are better off with short-term rather than with long-
term fee contracts, which leads to  II 2, CI W W > . In particular, the increase in expected welfare due 
to use of short-term fee rather than long-term fee contracts is  
2
II 2, CI 2 ) 1 (
4
3































Overall, social welfare generated throughout the two periods by a series of short-term  fee 
contracts,  CI II , 1 ST W W W
s
f + = , where subscript STf indicates short-term fee contracts 
)] ) 4 1 )( 8 ( ) 14 ( 4 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 ( 4 ) 3 2 ( 12 ( ) 1 ( 48 [
36
1
ST c c c c c W f µ µ µ µ µ µ µ + + + + − + − + − − − − = (28) 
and comparing (28) with  II 1, LT 2W W f ≡ , where subscript LTf stands for long-term fee contracts, 
allows to obtain the following result. 
Proposition  3.  If parameters  µ  and  c  satisfy  c ) 4 51 8 ( ) 8 ( 4
2 µ µ µ + + − +  
0 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 ( 4 < + − + − c c µ µ , short-term fee contracts are socially efficient. Otherwise, they 
are socially inferior to long-term fee contracts. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Short-term (revealing) fee contracts leads to higher social welfare than long-term fee contracts 
only when both µ, the probability of a good realization of production cost, and c, the magnitude 
of the bad realization of production cost
8
 
 are sufficiently high. In such a case, reduction on 
consumer surplus in period 1 when signaling exists is minimal as compared to consumer surplus 
in that period under long-term (non-revealing) fee contracts. In turn, this implies little reduction 
on welfare level in period 1, and this reduction is offset by the increase on welfare in period 2 due 
to a sequence of short-term fee contracts (and the recovering of complete information it leads to). 
In any other circumstance, long-term fee contracts are socially superior to short-term fee 
contracts. The result of Proposition 3 is graphically illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
                                                           
8 That is, the efficiency gap between licensees if their production costs differ or the firms' cost level if both of them 































Fig. 2. Short-term fee contracts and social welfare 
 
Expressions (16) and (22) denote, respectively, the total expected welfare of a long-term fee 
contract and of a series of short-term fee contracts. On the other hand, the level of social welfare 
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,                                                                         (29) 
where subscript STr denotes short-term royalty contracts. Similarly, if the patent holder licenses 
the innovation through long-term royalty contracts, expected social welfare is  
6
) ) 2 ( 8 (
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When comparing the social outcome of short- and long-term fee contracts to short- and long-term 
royalty contracts, the result is unambiguous: fee contracts are socially superior to royalty 
contracts due to the fact that royalties distort the licensees' behavior more than fees. Thus, the 
result of Proposition 3 remains valid in a context in which the patent holder can simultaneously 
choose the fee or royalty form of the contracts (including royalties in period 1 and fees in period 
2) and their duration. 
7. Conclusions 
With perfect and complete information, an outside patent holder prefers fee to royalty licensing. 
This result persists in an asymmetric information context, where each licensee acquires private 
information about its production cost emerged from the use of the innovation that may be then 
signaled to third parties (in a succession of short-term contracts) or not (in a long-term contract). 
In this case, the patent holder continues to prefer upfront fees instead of royalties. Indeed, a 
succession of short-term fee contracts (rather than a long-term fee contract) is the best dynamic 
licensing scheme for the patent holder, but socially efficient only when both the a priori 
probability of a firm being an efficient user of the innovation and the difference in licensees' 
production costs are sufficiently high; otherwise, long-term fee contracts are social superior to 
short-term fee contracts, in which case a conflict between private and social interests arises.  
Comparison of short-term fee contracts, short-term and long-term royalty contracts, and even 
those (short-term) contracts formed by royalties in period 1 and fees in period 2 affirms these 
findings. Hence, interaction between and outside patent holder (that motivates the use of fee 
licensing contracts) and asymmetric information (that encourages royalty based contracts) leads 
(short-term) fee contracts to be better off than royalty contracts. More precisely, the possibility of 
licensees' signaling confirms the superiority of fees over royalties and, within the fee contracts, of 
































Proof of Lemma 1.  
(i)  The result follows from the fact that 
2 2
2 ) 3 ) 2 1 ( ( ) 6 ) 2 ( ( ) 0 ; 0 ( c c c
i − − − =  π , 
2 2
2 ) 3 ) 1 ( ( ) 6 ) 2 ( ( ) ; 0 ( c c c c
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2 ) 3 1 ( ) 6 ) 3 2 ( ( ) 0 ; 0 ( − − =  c c
i π , and 
2 2
2 ) 3 ) 1 ( ( ) 6 ) 2 ( ( ) ; 0 ( c c c c
i + − − =  π . 
(ii) Immediate.   
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where superscript s denotes signaling and superscript * denotes the best reaction in period 1 of 
each high-cost licensee provided that, in period 2, it will be recognized as such. Condition (A1) 
represents the first-period output of a low-cost licensee i in the equilibrium of the two-period 
game: a low-cost licensee that signals its costs faithfully in period 1 forgoes the possibility of the 
“illicit” period 2 gains held out by Lemma 1; therefore it has no reason not to maximize its 
expected period 1 profit, without regard to period 2. On the other hand, a high-cost licensee 
producing any but the equilibrium quantity 
i
H q1  in period 1 would be seen as a low-cost licensee 
by the other players in period 2. Taking this into account in determining its optimal behavior in 
period 2, it would behave as in Lemma 1. Since its expected period 2 profit is not affected by its 
period 1 output (so long as the latter differs from 
i
H q1 ), in period 1 it would produce the quantity 
maximizing its single-period profit in that period as Condition (A2) states. In view of Lemma 1, a 
low-cost licensee will indeed be tempted to misrepresent itself if its gains in period 2 (as the 
result of its deception) are more than its losses in period 1 (as the result of producing output 
i
H q1  
instead of 
i
L q II , ). By contrast, a high-cost firm, for whom such behavior by a low-cost licensee 
would be highly detrimental in period 2, might find it to its overall advantage to set period 1 
output 
i
H q1  so low that deception is not profitable for a low-cost licensee. This coercion requires 
satisfaction of the self-selection Condition (A3). Finally, (A4) is the incentive-compatibility 
condition corresponding to each high-cost licensee, whereby its expected gains in the equilibrium 
exceed the expected value of the period 2 profit given by Lemma 1 plus the expected value of the 




H q .  By solving the incentive-compatibility 
conditions (A3)-(A4) as equalities, the continuum of separating equilibria is given by the interval 
of outputs  ] , [ 1
− − ∈ z r q
is
H , where  
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µ µ + − +
− =
− .                                                 (A6) 
 
The fact that 
− − < z r  in the entire (µ,c)-parameter space implies that the interval  ] , [
− − z r   is non-
degenerated. Hence, the output of each high-cost licensee forming part of the separating 
equilibrium of minimum cost is 
18








µ µ + − +
− = ≡
− .                                     (A7) 
On the other hand, denoting the profit-maximizing output of each high- and low-cost licensee in 






















+ = , respectively (see Equations (5) and 




H q q II , 1 1 <  for every admissible values of parameters 
µ and c. That is, the separating equilibrium is always costly.     
Proof of Lemma 3. When the patent holder offers a long-term contract (and II exists), the gross 



























π ,                                                        (A8) 
where superscript G  denotes gross profit. Thus, net profit (denoted by superscript N), 
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i,j=A,B; i≠j, amounts to  
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π                                                   (A9) 
 and its net profit is that stated in Table 1. It is evident that net profit of each firm, 
i E II π , is zero, 





i π µ µπ π . On the other hand, if a short-term contract is offered to licensees and 
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H F II , 1 II , 1 II , 1 − =π π , is as given in (17). Once more, the net profit to each firm i is 





Nis π µ µπ π . The same result of zero net profit for each licensee 
in period 2 when complete information is recovered can be derived.                                             
Proof of Proposition 2.  































(ii) When licensing is made through a long-term royalty contract covering the entire expected 
lifetime of the innovation, the patent holder obtains (see Antelo, 2009) 
2





r µ π − − = ,                                                        (A12) 
and comparison of (11) and (A12) shows the result stated in the first part of (ii). 
On the other hand, when the innovation is licensed by means of short-term royalty contracts 
(denoted by subscript STr), the patent holder's income is 
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if signaling in period 1 is costly (which is denoted by subscript c), and 
] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 [
6
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ST c c c
PH
rnc µ µ µ π − + − − + − − = ,                        (A14) 
if signaling in period 1 is not costly (which is denoted by subscript nc). By comparing (11) with 
(A13) and (A14), the result presented in (ii) holds.   
(iii)  If contracts of period 1 are based on royalty payments (and those of period 2 on  fee 















q  ,  i=A,B,                                                      (A15) 
where 
i r1  denotes the per-unit royalty to be paid by each licensee i in period 1, regardless of its 
type,  
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and 
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i µ .        (A18) 
The content of conditions (A17)-(A18) is similar to that of conditions (A1)-(A4). By solving 
(A17)-(A18) as equalities, once (A15) and (A16) are taken into account, the output of high-cost 
licensees that allow themselves to separate at minimum cost from low-cost licensees is 
18











µ µ + − +
−
−

















H q II , 1  the profit-maximizing output in period 1 of 
each high-cost licensee under incomplete information. That is, the separating equilibrium is costly 
for all admissible values of parameters µ and c. Consideration of (A15) yields 
18
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= , i=A,B.                                          (A20) 
On the other hand, from (A19) and (A20), the resolution of the patent holder’s problem, 
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as the optimal royalty rate in period 1. Finally, substitution of (A22) into (A19) and (A20) yields 
18 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 2 1 ( 6 1 1 c c q
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H µ µ + − + − =     and  9 ) ) 4 1 ( 4 ( 3 ) 1 ( 6 1 1 c c q
is
L µ µ − + − + =   as the 
equilibrium outputs of period 1 for high-cost and low-cost licensees, respectively. Thus, the 
patent holder's expected income in period 1 amounts to 
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where subscript rf indicates that licensing is done by means of royalties in period 1 and upfront 
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completes the result.     
Proof of Proposition 3. Taking into account the values of the second column of Table 1 and the 
fact that  ] ) 1 ( 1 )[ 2 1 (
2
) ~ , ~ ,( II ) ~ , ~ ,( II
j i j i c c c c Q CS − − = ,  the  expected consumer surplus per period in a 
regime of long-term fee contracts is 
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In turn, the net profit of each licensee i is zero (by virtue of Lemma 3), whereas the per period 
income of the patent holder amounts to 




PH µ µ π + − − − = .                                     (A26) 
From (A25) and (A26), the level of expected welfare through the entire lifetime of the innovation 
is  
] ) 3 8 )( 1 ( 8 [
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PH µ µ π − − − = + = .                                           (A27) 
On the other hand, a series of (two) short-term fee contracts leads to consumer surplus 
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and the patent holder's licensing income 
) ( 2 CI II , 1
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Hence, social welfare is as given in (28). From here, the result of Proposition 3  follows 
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